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Diane E. Hoﬀmann, JD, MS - Editor

Over the past 14 months, two Maryland Circuit Courts have adjudicated
cases involving the medically ineffective treatment provisions of the
Maryland Health Care Decisions Act
(HCDA). In each case, the provisions were relied on by a health care
provider to terminate a patient’s
life-sustaining treatment. This article
is based on the court papers ﬁled in
those cases, as well as conversations
about the legal process with one
or more attorneys involved in each
case. Neither the health care providers from the medical institutions nor
the attorneys disclosed any protected
health information due to the restrictions imposed by Maryland law and
HIPAA.
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Case #1
On Friday, December 1, 2017,
an attorney representing Harjeet
Malhi, the father of Gurpreet Singh
Malhi, a 32-year-old male patient
in a persistent vegetative state and
on a ventilator at Anne Arundel
Medical Center (AAMC), ﬁled a
motion for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) in the Circuit Court to
prevent AAMC from disconnecting
Gurpreet from the ventilator (Case
No. C-02-CV-17-003473).
Gurpreet, an Indian national
temporarily residing in the United
States, was admitted to the emergency department at AAMC on
t
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October 25, 2017 with a diagnosis of acute pancreatitis. Four days later,
he suﬀered a cardiac arrest, went into a coma, subsequently diagnosed
as a persistent vegetative state, and was placed on a ventilator. Approximately three and a half weeks later, based on the hospital’s policy on
“unbeneﬁcial treatment,” his treating physicians told his local family
members that they were going to remove Gurpreet from the ventilator
and discontinue other life-sustaining measures. The family members
objected to the hospital’s plans.
Gurpreet’s father, Harjeet, who spoke only Punjabi, traveled to Baltimore
from India as soon as he could (Nov. 30) to see his son and meet with his
physicians. Once he arrived, he also expressed his disagreement with the
decision to remove Gurpreet from the ventilator and halt other medical
treatment and implored the hospital and the treating physicians to wait
until he had time to pursue other treatment options.
Concerned that the hospital would move forward with the plan to remove
life-sustaining treatment (LST), on Dec. 1, Gurpreet’s father ﬁled the
motion for the TRO. The motion referred to provisions of the HCDA that
allow a family member to make health care decisions for patients lacking
decision-making capacity. The motion further stated that, according to
the statute, if
a health care provider intends not to comply with the wishes of
a surrogate, at the request of the surrogate to transfer care to
another facility, the provider will ‘. . . make every reasonable
eﬀort to transfer the patient to another health care provider,
. . assist in the transfer; and . . . comply with the instruction of
the surrogate . . . if a failure to comply with the instruction would
likely result in the death of the individual.
On Dec. 5, the court granted the TRO and directed AAMC to forgo
removing Gurpreet from the LST until a full adversarial hearing could be
held. Subsequent to the granting of the TRO, Mr. Malhi ﬁled an amended
petition to temporarily and permanently enjoin the hospital from withdrawing LST from Gurpreet and to order AAMC to meaningfully assist
the family in the transfer of care.
The hearing, which included testimony from several family members,
the treating doctor, and the hospital bioethicist, was held on Friday, Dec.
15th. At the hearing, Mr. Malhi's attorney explained that her client was
requesting a preliminary injunction to prevent the hospital from taking
Gurpreet oﬀ of LST and so that arrangements could be made to transport
him to a hospital in India. The family had made eﬀorts to transfer
Gurpreet to several other hospitals in Maryland but none were willing to
accept him in his current condition. The judge expressed concern about
the cost of transport to India for a patient requiring ventilator support and
asked whether there was any source of funding for the transfer, i.e., third
party private or government insurance or other source. Because of the
patient’s immigration status there was no public source of payment and

the patient’s family had not yet approached the Embassy of India to
see if it might oﬀer assistance.
Witnesses called by Mr. Malhi's
attorney included two relatives
of the patient (a cousin and his
uncle’s brother-in-law), in addition
to Gurpreet’s father. Through their
testimony, it was brought to the
attention of the court that the hospital had issued a "no escalation
of care" order that was not in accordance with the family’s wishes.
Subsequent to the order, they contacted other Maryland hospitals to
see if they would accept Gurpreet.
Initially, one hospital’s intake coordinator agreed to accept Gurpreet and place him on its wait list for
care. After this, AAMC lifted the
"no escalation" order and began
to treat Gurpreet with antibiotics
and blood transfusions as he had a
blood infection that had not been
treated because of the order. The
day after this treatment, the family members observed that some
of his vital signs and lab numbers
had improved and that he looked
much better. They believed that
with continued treatment he would
have a chance to live. Gurpreet's
father also testiﬁed that he had
spoken to a physician in India who
told him that he could get Gurpreet
admitted to any one of a number
of hospitals in New Delhi.
Also at the hearing, a physician
from AAMC, who was an expert
in pulmonary critical care and
who had been involved in Mr.
Malhi’s care, testiﬁed. She stated
that Gupreet was a 32 y.o. man
who had unfortunately sustained
a few complications from his
alcohol intake including delirium
tremens and severe pancreatitis.
The latter led to renal and respira-

tory failure and a cardiac arrest
that resulted in brain damage. She
further stated that he had been in a
persistent vegetative state for eight
weeks and that such a diagnosis
is typically made after a patient is
not aware of his or her surroundings for four weeks. After three
months, a diagnosis of permanent
vegetative state could be made.
The physician further stated that
she believed that any additional
treatment of Gurpreet would be
medically ineﬀective in that it
would not prevent his death or
deterioration. She told the family that she believes the role of
medicine is to prolong life, not to
prolong death and the most humane thing for Gurpreet would be
to ensure his comfort and not to
prolong his death. Mr. Malhi's attorney asked if this would include
continuing to give him nutrition
and hydration. The physician
responded that for a patient with
renal failure, continuing to give
him hydration and nutrition would
likely mean he would experience
his last days ﬁlled with ﬂuid and
edematous, which would be very
uncomfortable. Thus, in her view,
it would not be appropriate to give
him IV ﬂuids.
Also, a note in the medical record
by a nephrologist treating Gurpreet was read into evidence. In
the note, the nephrologist stated
that he believed the provision of
ongoing renal replacement therapy
should be regarded as futile and
for this reason “continuation of
kidney dialysis has created an ethical conﬂict for me as a provider in
this case.”
In closing remarks, Mr. Malhi's
attorney stated that her client

believed that his son would get
much better care at his home in
India and would like an opportunity to ﬁnd a way to get him there.
She also said her client requested
that, pending the transfer, the no
escalation of care order be lifted
to give Mr. Malhi the strength to
withstand a transfer and asked for
a reasonable length of time to get
that done.
The attorney for AAMC stated that
the legislature enacted a provision
for medically ineﬀective treatment for exactly this type of case,
i.e., when artiﬁcial care is only
prolonging the dying process. He
referred to the four legal requirements for granting a Preliminary
Injunction (PI) (see Box, p.4) and
stated that “the legislature has
given us a clear indication of what
the public interest is by enacting
this provision. There is harm on
both sides of the table. The patient
is being harmed by continuing a
painful dying process, the providers are being harmed by giving
morally and ethically inappropriate care and watching the patient
suﬀer when the law allows for
discontinuing care.” Finally, he
addressed the plaintiﬀ’s chance of
success on the merits, and concluded that there was virtually no
evidence that the plaintiﬀs would
be successful in ﬁnding a hospital
willing to accept transfer of the
patient, that no hospitals they had
contacted in the U.S. had agreed
to take the patient and even if a
hospital in India would agree to
accept him, the transfer to India
would be cost prohibitive.
After the hearing, the court granted a time-limited PI prohibiting
the hospital from removing Gurpreet from the ventilator or disconMid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 3

Patients ask Courts for TRO and Preliminary Injunction
In both the Malhi and Kwon cases, the patients asked the courts for a temporary restraining order, often referred to as a TRO, and a Preliminary Injunction. Both are forms of injunction but a temporary
restraining order is typically issued in circumstances where immediate action is needed, speciﬁcally,
where there is not time for a court hearing on the issue because the requester will suﬀer “immediate, substantial and irreparable injury” unless the order is issued. Courts often issue TROs based on
aﬃdavits from a person whose interests are about to be harmed. In Maryland, such injunctions may
not remain in eﬀect more than ten days for a resident and not more than 35 days for a non-resident. A
preliminary injunction, in contrast, is issued only after there has been an opportunity for a full adversarial hearing on the issue. In both cases, the party seeking the injunction must prove each of the
following four factors: (1) there is a high likelihood that they will prevail on the merits; 2) the harm
to the plaintiﬀ if the injunction is not granted will be greater than the harm to the defendant if it is
granted; 3) the plaintiﬀ will suﬀer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and 4) it is in the
public interest to grant the injunction. In these cases, it will virtually always be the case that without
the TRO patients will suﬀer immediate, substantial and irreparable injury, as they will likely die without continued life-sustaining treatment.
tinuing other LST but denied
the plaintiﬀ’s request for escalation of care, ﬁnding that such
additional treatment would be
medically ineﬀective. The court
ordered that the PI expire on
Wednesday, December 20th,
giving the family three full business days to ﬁnd a hospital that
would accept Gurpreet. During
that time period, the hospital was
required to make "every reasonable eﬀort to transfer the patient
to another health care provider."
The court stated that it could not
ﬁnd that the plaintiﬀ would not
be successful in ﬁnding a place to
transfer his son and that it would
be in the public interest to allow
the patient to return to his home
in India. Also, in weighing the
harms of denying the request to
explore transfer, the court found
that while the hospital would
suﬀer ﬁnancial harms, the patient
would suﬀer irreparable harm.
In light of this, the court ordered
the plaintiﬀ to post bond in the
amount of $15,000 in three days
4 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

to cover the hospital’s expenses of
maintaining the patient on LST as
the Maryland rule on injunctions
requires posting of a bond for the
costs of damages. If the bond was
not posted in the required time
frame the order would expire. The
court also made it clear to the parties that the chances that it would
grant another extension of the PI if
the plaintiﬀ could not ﬁnd another
institution willing to accept the
patient were "slim, if not nonexistent." In other words, the court
was providing Gurpreet’s family with one more opportunity to
determine if another place of care
was available. If they could not
ﬁnd a place within the three business days, the PI would expire and
the hospital could proceed with
its plan to stop all life sustaining
treatment.
The family was unable to ﬁnd
another provider who would accept the patient in the allotted time
frame. Therefore, the family did
not proceed with its claim for in-

junctive relief and the hospital
ultimately removed the patient
from the ventilator and other life
support.
Case #2
Less than a month after the Malhi
case was decided by the Anne
Arundel County Circuit Court, a
second case involving medically
ineﬀective treatment was ﬁled
in Baltimore City Circuit Court
(Case No. 24-C-18-000189). The
complaint was ﬁled by Haeyoung
Lee on January 12, 2018, on
behalf of her husband, Hyok Won
Kwon, a patient at Johns Hopkins
Medical Center (JHMC). In August 2017, Kwon was diagnosed
with head and neck squamous
cell carcinoma. He presented
with a tumor that progressed
from August to January from a
lump below his right neck the
"size of a large egg to a much
larger mass that extend[ed] from
the right side to the throat and
the left side." Lee, who was also

Kwon’s agent under his durable
power of attorney for health care,
alleged that JHMC had refused
to give curative treatment to her
husband because of an erroneous
assumption about his condition,
speciﬁcally that because he had
asymptomatic tuberculosis he
could not receive chemotherapy.
She ﬁled the complaint for “medical emergency injunctive relief”
because on the evening of January 9, 2018 she was notiﬁed that
JHMC personnel were planning to
disconnect her husband the following morning from the ventilator without the family’s consent
and against her husband’s wishes.
Lee called 911 and sought the assistance of the police, who directed her to call the courthouse where
she was able to obtain temporary
relief – an administrative judge,
by verbal order, on the morning of
January 10th, required that JHMC
keep Mr. Kwon on the ventilator
until his family was able to initiate
court proceedings on his behalf.
On Friday, January 12th, the court
held an initial hearing on the case.
Ms. Lee (acting pro se) and one of
her daughters testiﬁed along with
Mr. Kwon’s attending physician
and the co-chair of the Hopkins
Ethics Committee, who had consulted on Mr. Kwon’s case.

case, it had been in place for over
100 days. The tube was inserted
originally because Mr. Kwon’s
tumor was putting pressure on
his airway, making it diﬃcult for
him to breathe. Although a tracheostomy is usually performed
after about two weeks to ventilate
the lungs rather than keeping the
endotracheal tube in place, in
his case, Mr. Kwon’s family did
not consent to that procedure at
the time. The attending further
explained that the patient was no
longer a candidate for a tracheostomy; the ENT surgeon said it was
no longer feasible as his tumor had
grown, despite radiation therapy.
The attending also explained that
he did not believe further treatment would be medically eﬀective
and that the hospital staﬀ should
focus on keeping Mr. Kwon
comfortable. He also stated that
no other physicians at Hopkins
who had seen Mr. Kwon, including ENT surgeons and oncologists,
believed further therapy would be
medically eﬀective. The oncologists said they would not give him

chemotherapy because he was so
weak. The treating physicians had
documented that further treatment
would be medically ineﬀective.
The attending further testiﬁed that
the disagreement with the family developed two days earlier
when the connection between
Mr. Kwon’s e-tube and the tube
connected to the ventilator kept
coming apart. Staﬀ was having
a diﬃcult time keeping the tubes
connected because the end of the
e-tube was friable and slit and
there was a leak where the tubes
were connected. Due to moisture
in the area where the tubes connected, tape was ineﬀective and
thus not a viable long-term solution. The physician also said that
it was probably not feasible to
replace the e-tube; it might result
in losing the airway altogether. If
the airway closed up, it would not
be possible to insert another tube.
Furthermore, Mr. Kwon might
experience considerable pain if
his physicians removed the e-tube
as there could be adhesions

At the hearing, the attending physician explained that the hospital
staﬀ were encountering increasing
diﬃculty attaching the endotracheal tube coming out of Mr. Kwon’s
windpipe to the tube that connects
it to the ventilator. The e-tube had
been in place much longer than is
typical. An e-tube is usually only
in place for a few hours, days or
possibly a couple of weeks. In this
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 5

Furthermore, Mr. Kwon might
experience considerable pain if his
physicians removed the e-tube as
there could be adhesions between
the lining of his windpipe and the
tube. The physician also indicated
that Mr. Kwon’s condition met the
statutory deﬁnition of an "endstage condition."
In response to questions from the
judge and the hospital attorney,
the physician distinguished between the types of care that would
qualify as comfort care versus
an escalation of care. He stated
that he believed that comfort care
would not include vasopressors,
antibiotics, or other care to treat
new complications and that initiating CPR or increasing the settings
of the ventilator would be an escalation of care. However, he did
not believe that maintaining the
ventilation would be an escalation.
The co-chair of the hospital’s
ethics committee also testiﬁed.
He explained the role of the ethics committee and explained the
impact of continued treatment
of Mr. Kwon as requested by the
family. He said that the treating
staﬀ felt moral distress at, among
other things, the threat to the
dignity of the patient by continuing ineﬀective treatment. The
co-chair also said that members of
the ethics committee had met with
the family in December as well
as the week of the hearing and
learned more about the family’s
perspective. The family felt that
any form of life is meaningful and
wanted life-sustaining treatment to
be continued for as long as possible. They also continued to hold
out hope that Mr. Kwon's cancer
could be treated once his TB was
under control.
6 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

Mr. Kwon’s daughter also testiﬁed that the family found meaning
with every day they had with their
father. She said he was not awake
all the time but would interact
with them when he was awake.
She said that only a week before
the hearing, he had become emotional, tearing up as they told him
stories. Such interactions made it
diﬃcult for the family to accept
the hospital’s decision to stop the
ventilator support.
After this hearing, the Court
issued a TRO requiring JHMC to
continue ventilator therapy for Mr.
Kwon, "to the extent possible."
It also found that Mr. Kwon was
"suﬀering from an end-stage condition" and that "escalation of his
treatment would be medically ineffective within the meaning of Md.
Code, Sec. 5-601(o) of the HealthGeneral Article." The Order was
to stay in eﬀect for no longer than
ten days during which time any
party could apply for modiﬁcation or dissolution of the Order on
two days’ notice. The Court also
scheduled a second hearing for the
morning of Tuesday, January 16th,
to allow the Court to hear from
several individuals who were unable to come to the initial hearing.
At the second hearing, additional
members of Mr. Kwon’s family
were present, including his daughter, brother, and brother-in-law.
An internist and pulmonary medicine fellow who had been involved
in Mr. Kwon’s care also testiﬁed on behalf of Johns Hopkins.
They reported that Mr. Kwon’s
condition had changed over the
weekend; one of his pupils was
not reactive, which could indicate
deep sedation, metabolic disturbance or very severe brain dam-

age. Much of what was explored at
this hearing was the feasibility of
transferring Mr. Kwon to another
hospital, speciﬁcally whether it
was a realistic possibility and how
far the plaintiﬀ and her family had
gone in exploring it.
At the end of the hearing, the
judge asked whether the hospital
would be agreeable to transferring
the patient if the family were to
ﬁnd a hospital that would accept
the patient within the next 24 – 48
hours. The attorney for the hospital responded that at no point had
the hospital indicated that it would
stand in the way of transfer; the
issue was how much Hopkins was
required to do pending the transfer
and how long they would have to
continue to provide care if transfer
was not imminent.
In response to an assertion by the
plaintiﬀ that the statute requires a
hospital to provide LST pending
transfer if failure to do so would
result in the death of the patient,
the judge asked, but "for how
long?" The plaintiﬀ's attorney
responded that the statute does not
provide a limit. The judge then
posed the following hypothetical
case: "suppose that you explored
with Alexandria [Hospital] and
they said no and then you said to
[Hopkins], we are exploring with
Prince George’s Medical Center
and they said no two days later,
and then you said we are exploring with Fairfax Hospital and they
said no two days later, and then
you said we are exploring with
Richmond Hospital and they said
no. . . On that reading of the statute, you could prolong the requirement of medically ineﬀective care
indeﬁnitely."

The judge later stated that he
rejected the notion that section
6-613 of the statute "means that
the moment at which a patient
or his family articulates the possibility of a transfer that necessarily means the provider has to
provide exactly what the family
requests until that transfer is accomplished." Rather, it must be
interpreted as meaning that LST
is to be continued if eﬀorts made
to transfer are reasonable and the
possibility of transfer is feasible.
"My construction of the statute
is that in these particular circumstances, . . . the plaintiﬀ has failed
to show that Hopkins Hospital has
an obligation to undertake every
treatment modality that the family requests while there is pending
some possibility of transferring
him to another hospital because
the plaintiﬀ has not provided
evidence that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the transfer will occur or that it is imminent."
After the second hearing, the
court issued a "modiﬁed limited
temporary restraining order" and
denied the plaintiﬀ’s request for a
preliminary injunction because the
plaintiﬀ had not been able to show
that she would likely succeed on
the merits of her claim that Johns
Hopkins is required to render
treatment to Mr. Kwon above what
it was currently providing. The
Court issued the modiﬁed TRO
to ensure that Hopkins continued
to provide the level of care that it
was currently providing, including ventilator therapy, while Mr.
Kwon’s family pursued a possible
transfer of Mr. Kwon to another
hospital. However, the court stated
that it recognized that the ventilator therapy was being provided
"only through extraordinary mea-

sures to cope with the deteriorating breathing tube" and that the
hospital was "required to use its
best eﬀorts to continue the therapy, but only as long as . . . feasible
to do so." Best eﬀorts, the court
went on to say, "means reasonable eﬀorts in the circumstances
and does not include requiring a
nurse or technician manually to
hold together the connection of the
ventilator to the breathing tube."
The Court stated that, "with the
single exception of adjustments
in the ventilator controls, [the]
Defendant ha[d] appropriately
assessed Mr. Kwon’s condition
and the fact that escalation of his
care would not be medically effective within the meaning of Md.
Code, Sec. 5-601(o) of the HealthGeneral Article." The Court
further found that Mr. Kwon had
an "end-stage condition" and that
JHMC was not "required to render
care that it has determined . . . to
be medically ineﬀective in light of
that condition."

credence to clinical evaluations
of medically ineﬀective treatment
and to allow a hospital to terminate such treatment, despite patient or family objections, if after a
reasonable period of time no other
hospital will accept the patient.
Such reasonable period of time, at
least in these two cases, appears to
be approximately ten days.
Diane Hoﬀmann, JD, MS
Jacob A. France Professor of Health Law
Director, Law & Health Care Program
University of Maryland School of Law

Finally, the Court ordered that
JHMC cooperate with Mr. Kwon’s
family to transfer Mr. Kwon if
a hospital agreed to accept him
as a patient, that the order would
remain in eﬀect for no longer than
ten days from the date of initial issuance (Jan. 12th) and that it could
be extended for another ten days
for "cause shown."
Ultimately, the family was unable
to ﬁnd another facility that would
accept the patient and he died at
Hopkins Hospital.
Both this case and the prior case
indicate a willingness on the part
of the Maryland courts (at least
at the trial court level) to give
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 7

Court Intervention & Cultural Sensitivity
Most ethics experts agree that
courts are the least-favorable
place to resolve conﬂicts about
end-of-life (EOL) treatment.
State statutes, such as Maryland’s Health Care Decisions Act
(HCDA) and similar legislation in
California, Texas, and New York,
oﬀer an alternative to the courts
by deﬁning a process for resolving disputes about withholding
or withdrawing medical interventions that have been deemed medically ineﬀective or inappropriate.
In this issue of the Newsletter,
we review the ﬁrst two Maryland
cases where judges aﬃrmed the
provisions in the HCDA that allowed withdrawing life support
over surrogates’ objections. Here,
I oﬀer some reﬂections on what
role culture may have played and
clinicians’ duties to respect diﬀering cultural beliefs and practices
in the context of medically ineffective or ethically inappropriate
interventions at the end of life.
Mr. Malhi was from India, temporarily living in the United States
(U.S.). His father (who traveled
from India upon hearing of the
plans to withdraw his son’s life
support) only spoke Punjabi. This
is very little to go on to speculate
about the core beliefs, practices,
and values that guided medical
decision-making for him. Mr.
Malhi could well have ascribed to
non-mainstream beliefs and practices. However, with nothing else
to go on, we can try to extrapolate from statistics: about 80% of
Indians practice Hinduism, with a
smaller percentage identifying as
8 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

Muslim, Christian, or Sikh. If Mr. Malhi were Hindu, the concept of
“karma” may be meaningful (i.e., that past actions aﬀect our present life
circumstances and our current actions aﬀect our future circumstances).
It’s not uncommon for Hindus to consult numerologists to inform important decisions, such as naming a child, marrying, or even withdrawing
life support (see https://www.hinduwebsite.com/hinduism/h_numerology.asp). Family harmony is valued, as well as respecting social order.
Given that Mr. Malhi had been unable to communicate his values and
preferences prior to becoming comatose, decision-making would fall to
a surrogate. Assuming Mr. Malhi lacked a spouse or domestic partner,
according to the HCDA, his father is considered a legally authorized
surrogate (on par with Mr. Malhi’s mother). There are several challenges
here in providing “culturally sensitive” care to Mr. Mahli and his family:
1.

2.

DISTANCE: While Mr. Malhi had some family members
locally available, his surrogate—his father—was thousands of miles away, requiring communication presumably through a phone or online Punjabi medical interpreter. This complicates the process by which trust is established between the surrogate and clinical team.
CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION: While use
of certiﬁed medical interpreters is the gold standard for
communicating with patients or family members who
don’t speak English, there are known cultural diﬀerences
that contribute to gaps in understanding among stakeholders. A “cultural broker” can help bridge these gaps,
but eﬀective cultural brokers are not readily available.

3.

4.

REAL OR PERCEIVED BIAS: We don’t know whether Mr. Malhi was in the U.S. legally, but
the court makes clear that he didn’t have health insurance to cover his ongoing hospitalization or
his travel back to India. While these factors should not aﬀect decisions about whether life support is medically ineﬀective, surrogates may perceive that such decisions are inﬂuenced by the
patient’s citizenship, race, or health insurance status, which can thwart the trust-building process
necessary to ground eﬀective communications.
TIMELINE: The physicians’ decision to withdraw life support occurred relatively quickly after
the patient’s admission to the ICU (about one month). According to the summary, the ventilator
was deemed medically ineﬀective after the patient was determined to be in a persistent* vegetative state (PVS). However, patients in PVS can remain stable on life support for much longer
than one month. What justiﬁes moving more quickly to withdraw life support rather than giving
the family more time? In Mr. Malhi’s case, multi-organ failure precluded ICU discharge and presumably made his death imminent. Competition for ICU beds is an unavoidable consideration.
Indeed, fair resource allocation and institutional stewardship are in tension with motivations to
accommodate family members’ emotional, spiritual, religious, and/or cultural needs and values.
How much time allotted to loved ones at a dying patient’s bedside is considered an acceptable
accommodation?

Let's assume that all eﬀorts were made to inform the family of his condition, but despite the staﬀ’s and ethics
consultants' best eﬀorts, the father, acting as the legally authorized surrogate, requested continued interventions
deemed medically ineﬀective or inappropriate (e.g., renal dialysis, ventilatory support, blood products, antibiotics, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation eﬀorts). One justiﬁcation for moving forward to withhold/withdraw
life support using the HCDA provisions in such a case is that doing so constitutes a form of “culturally sensitive” medical paternalism. That is, in some cultures, surrogates demonstrate their love and ﬁdelity by asserting
that “everything be done” for the patient. In some countries, this demand is not interpreted literally by medical
providers, as it often is here in the U.S.. Furthermore, the expanded options for “doing everything” in U.S. critical care and trauma units complicates bridging this cultural gap. Having the medical team make a clear recommendation to stop interventions that are merely prolonging Mr. Malhi’s impending death may ease the family’s
burden in feeling complicit in contributing to his death (see Box on page 11).
Mr. Malhi objected to the hospital withdrawing his son’s ventilator. Perhaps this was because he viewed the act
of ventilator withdrawal as causing his son’s death. While it’s generally agreed that there is no ethical distinction between withholding or withdrawing life support (i.e., the underlying illness or injury causes the death, not
the ventilator withdrawal), it feels diﬀerent to those involved. Moreover, some individuals recognize a moral
distinction between stopping versus starting life support (e.g., Orthodox Jews). When ICU clinicians institute
“do not escalate treatment” orders for dying patients, they are acknowledging and accommodating this perspective. Whether this is a reasonable accommodation is an open question, given the burdens of ICU-level care to
the patient, the competition for ICU beds, and incurred hospital costs (both monetary and non-monetary). Yet, in
Mr. Malhi’s case, the family objected to the no escalation of treatment order as well—that is, they believed the
antibiotics and blood transfusions Mr. Malhi had received helped him and should be continued, that they were
not just “prolonging his dying.” So, Mr. Malhi’s family objected both to withdrawing and withholding interventions because they perceived a beneﬁt in prolonging life whereas the medical team believed the burdens and
costs of the interventions would not justify the potential minimal extension of Mr. Malhi’s life.
The case of Hyok Won Kwon presents another opportunity to explore to what extent culture played a role in a
patient’s trajectory of care and in ultimate court involvement. While a full exploration of Korean culture and
its variations is beyond what can be presented here ("Kwon and "Lee" are common Korean last names so it is
assumed that the patient was Korean), general characteristics include a strong regard for ﬁlial piety (respecting
and honoring one’s blood relatives and ancestors), clearly divided family roles, and family interdependence over
individualism (Kim & Kelly, 2006). Koreans, especially elders, may prefer Hanbang, also known as Hanyak,
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and Oriental medicine, as the preferred method of health care. This is based on balance between um (akin to
yin) and yang, and balance of ﬁre, earth, metal, water, and wood. It’s not uncommon to blend these beliefs and
practices with Western medical interventions. Whether such cultural beliefs were at play in the decision to forgo
Mr. Kwon’s tracheostomy is an open question. It’s indicated that his family believed that any form of life was
meaningful and they valued time spent around his bedside, which is why they requested that life-sustaining
interventions be continued for as long as possible. Such beliefs are common across diﬀerent cultures and religions.
What is at issue for both of these cases is what we consider a “culturally sensitive” accommodation. In the
Kwon case, the decision to not escalate medical care and to stop the ventilator was inﬂuenced by physically not
being able to continue mechanical ventilation (i.e., the lack of a tracheostomy and deteriorating endotracheal
tube precluded maintaining the airway necessary to continue mechanical ventilation). In the Malhi case, the
decision to stop the ventilator was based on an appraisal that keeping him alive for a few days (presumably a
maximum of two weeks, assuming his kidneys had shut down) was of no beneﬁt. Brown (2018) suggests that in
such cases clinicians stand by their appraisal that such interventions are not suﬃciently beneﬁcial to justify burdens and costs, to avoid confusion that terms such as “medically futile” or “ethically inappropriate” engender.
The discussion surrounding burdens to the patient and to the staﬀ is interesting. Descriptions of suﬀering inﬂicted on Mr. Malhi are questionable given the reported medical opinion that he was irreversibly unconscious
(in which case, he would be incapable of suﬀering). In both cases, however, eﬀects on staﬀ were acknowledged
(i.e., staﬀ experienced moral distress by having to inﬂict interventions that appeared to cause harm or indignity
to these patients). What about eﬀects on survivors? This is the question at issue. Surely, providing culturally
sensitive care doesn’t mean doing whatever family members request. In considering what “doing everything”
might entail to minimize future regrets of a dying patient’s kin, what do we consider compassionate and fair?
Brierley, et al. (2013) found that out of 203 pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) patients for whom withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment was recommended, 11 (~5%) involved protracted discussions with parents who objected, largely based on religious beliefs (e.g., sanctity of life). The authors observed that “Christian fundamentalist
churches with African evangelical origins featured most frequently” (Brierley, et al., 2013, p. 574). Perhaps the
same justiﬁcation for mandating blood transfusions to children of Jehovah’s Witnesses can justify overriding
such individual’s requests. Kassim and Alias (2016) and Rezaei et al. (2016) suggest alternative interpretations
of vitalist religious positions.
Regarding fairness, Kapottos and Youngner (2015) point out a notable shortcoming of the Texas Advance Directive Act (TADA), a law that is similar to the HCDA but includes additional procedural mandates:
By applying itself only to cases brought by physicians, the process incompletely takes into account the
values touted in the TADA—namely, preventing harm to patients, avoiding the provision of unseemly
care, and providing good stewardship of medical resources … In order to fully preserve professional
and institutional integrity as the TADA claims to do, policies should act to prevent physicians from
oﬀering or initiating [emphasis added] treatments that have little or no beneﬁt to patients while
inﬂicting signiﬁcant harm. Truly fair processes would consider the entire picture. Failure to do so is at
best an example of performative inconsistency. At worst it could be viewed as hypocritical or unjust
because it does not treat similar cases alike. (Kapottos &Youngner, 2015, pp. 36-37)
By relying on individual physicians to decide to withhold or withdraw treatments considered medically ineﬀective, instances of bias and injustice (whether actual or perceived) may thwart other eﬀorts to establish the trust
that obviates resorting to courts to settle disputes. Kapottos and Youngner single out Boston Children’s Hospital
as the only institution they are aware of that has eﬀectively addressed this issue at the organizational level
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(i.e., providing compassionate,
culturally sensitive end-of-life
care that sets consistent limits
on interventions deemed medically ineﬀective). They suggest
creating and sharing a taxonomy
of cases referred to courts to
enhance transparency and help
guide practice. Perhaps toward
that end, Mr. Kwon and Mr.
Mahli have served this greater
purpose by starting this process of
reﬂection.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
* NOTE: Recent guidelines call
for a change in terminology from
“permanent” or “persistent” vegetative state” to “chronic” vegetative state (Giacino et al., 2018).
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How to Avoid Court in Medically Ineﬀective Treatment Cases
In many cases, if information is communicated to a surrogate in a culturally sensitive manner, the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA) provisions need not be invoked and court involvement can be
avoided. How might this be accomplished? Kon (2011) provides one such approach, which he dubbed
“informed nondissent.” This would involve ﬁrst conveying that the patient is dying, using known communication standards for breaking bad news (Baile et al., 2000). Then, the surrogate would be told what
would and would not be done for the patient, and if the surrogate didn’t object, the team would proceed
with the plan. For example, the physician might say: “We’re going to treat your [dad, husband, son…]
like we would a member of our own family. We will treat him with love and respect in his ﬁnal days.
We’ll make sure he doesn’t suﬀer” (Kon, 2011, p. 22). Questions or objections (e.g., “There must be
something more you can do to save him!”) should be answered directly (e.g., “I’m so sorry. It’s too late.
He is too ill. All the things we use here, like shocking the heart after it stops or cleansing the kidneys
when they shut down, won’t work for your [dad, husband, son …]. They won’t prevent his death.”). The
HCDA requirement to inform the surrogate that an intervention is being withheld or withdrawn because
it is medically ineﬀective or inappropriate, and to allow the option of transfer, is only relevant if the surrogate objects to the medical recommendations.
Baile, W.F., Buckman, R., Lenzi, R., Glober, G., Beale, E.A., & Kudelka, A.P. (2000). SPIKES- A sixstep protocol for delivering bad news: Application to the patient with cancer. Oncologist, 5(4), 302-311.
Kon, A.A. (2011). Informed non-dissent: A better option than slow codes when families cannot bear to
say "let her die". Am J Bioeth, 11(11), 22-3.
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The Ethics of Medical Repatriation
status is impacting these decisions,
and what is considered “fair” to
the patient and to the hospital, is
complicated.

The Malhi case brings to mind the
issue of medical repatriation, the
practice where hospitals transfer
immigrant patients to their home
countries for continued care. In
their eﬀort to seek continuing care
for Mr. Malhi, his family sought
to delay the hospital from ceasing life-sustaining treatment while
they tried to arrange transport to
a hospital in his native India. The
Malhi case is unique in that the
patient’s family was requesting
transfer; in many cases, the hospital initiates transfer for patients
whose conditions no longer necessitate hospital-level care. As a result of their immigrant status (e.g.
undocumented, visa-based, etc.),
these patients often lack health
insurance, the ﬁnancial resources
to pay out-of-pocket, eligibility
for public beneﬁt programs, or
the familial support necessary to
facilitate transfer to subacute care
facilities or home settings.
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These cases present a signiﬁcant
challenge for U.S. hospitals. The
Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act of 1986 requires all Medicare-participating
hospitals to screen and stabilize
any individual who presents with
an emergency medical condition.
Once stabilized, however, patients
may have continuing medical or
care needs that would best be met
in a subacute facility. Subacute
facilities, however, have no legal
obligation to accept such patients
and hospitals face the prospect
of providing unreimbursed care
indeﬁnitely. Sometimes, when
other facilities decline to accept a patient like Malhi, it is an
indicator that the currently provided medical interventions are
medically ineﬀective (sometimes
referred to as “non-beneﬁcial”
in that they are only prolonging
the dying process). The question
of how a patient’s immigration

One provider relayed a story of
a woman who suﬀered a major
stroke two weeks after arriving in
the U.S. on a visa. Once stabilized,
her U.S.-based family members
refused to accept the patient in
their home and the patient’s lack
of eligibility for medical assistance ruled out placement in a
skilled nursing facility. Ultimately,
the hospital paid for the patient’s
care in a skilled nursing facility
followed by a group home over
the course of several years until
family members in the native
country expressed a willingness to
care for the patient. The hospital
then funded the patient’s transport
to her native country including
transportation and lodging costs
for a family member to accompany her on the trip. The aforementioned case cost the hospital more
than $1.5M in uncompensated
care.
Hospitals across the country
are facing similar cases and it is
becoming increasingly common
to resolve such cases through
medical repatriation. A 2012 study
found more than 800 instances of
medical repatriations in the U.S.,
likely an underestimate of the
practice given the lack of reporting
requirements.1 Changes to federal
funding of healthcare under the
Aﬀordable Care Act have likely

contributed to greater reliance on
the practice in the last four years.1
Medical repatriation raises challenging legal and ethical questions
for healthcare providers. Indeed,
the practice has been met with
pointed criticism from bioethicists,
legal scholars and members of
the media. Some have argued that
such cases constitute human rights
violations while others assert that
only the federal government may
legally “deport” individuals present in the U.S. without authorization.2 There have been troubling
examples cited, in some instances
involving legal immigrants and
U.S. citizens. In 2008, for example, the University Medical Center in Tucson sought to transfer
Elliott Bustamante, an infant with
U.S. citizenship born with Down
syndrome and a heart condition,
to Mexico over the objections
of his undocumented immigrant
parents.3 A few years earlier, a
Florida hospital forcibly transported an undocumented immigrant back to his native Guatemala
despite an ongoing legal dispute
playing out in court as well as inadequate services in Guatemala to
treat patients with traumatic brain
injuries.4
In addition to the myriad legal
questions, medical repatriation
also implicates a number of ethical concerns regarding autonomy,
informed consent, justice, beneﬁcence, non-maleﬁcence and trust,
among others. I discuss several of
these below in an eﬀort to highlight some important considerations for hospitals as they consider medical repatriation for patients
in their care.

Autonomy and Informed Consent
Respect for autonomy or an individual’s right to self-determination
in the healthcare context is a core
principle of biomedical ethics.
While not the situation in the
Malhi case, in many instances,
particularly those involving
undocumented patients, repatriation occurs without the informed
consent of the patient or in direct
opposition to the patient’s, or their
family’s, stated care preferences.
Of particular concern to critics
of involuntary medical repatriation is the extrajudicial nature of
the process.1 While Immigrations
and Customs Enforcement may
be contacted in some cases, there
are many instances where hospitals are transferring immigrants
to their native countries with no
governmental or judicial oversight
and patients are therefore unable
to seek recourse if they oppose
the transfer. As others have noted,
medical repatriation implicates
both health care and immigration
law. For undocumented immigrants, return to a home country
can have serious consequences
for their ability to return to the
U.S. (i.e., inability to return for a
speciﬁed period of time ranging
from three to ten years) and some
have argued that clear information on those consequences needs
to be communicated to the patient
in order for consent to be fully
informed.5
Beneﬁcence and Non-maleﬁcence
The principle of beneﬁcence
requires healthcare providers to
act in the best interests of their
patients while the principle of
non-maleﬁcence refers to the

provider’s duty to do no harm to
the patient. In the case detailed at
the beginning of this article, the
patient required a level of care
typically provided by a skilled
nursing facility—a type of facility
that is largely not present in her
native country. Even in those instances where analogous facilities
are present in the native country,
standards of care and quality may
diﬀer markedly from those in the
U.S. The principles of beneﬁcence
and non-maleﬁcence create an
obligation on the part of hospitals
to fully explore care options in the
patient’s home country and work
with identiﬁed institutions or
family caregivers to execute the
transfer in a manner that minimizes risk to the patient.
Justice
In considering the practice of
medical repatriation for solving
conﬂicts about medically ineﬀective treatment, justice concerns
are also raised. Some bioethicists
claim that determining whether a
treatment is medically ineﬀective
simply boils down to a harm-beneﬁt analysis, and that it can (and
should) be considered separately
from resource allocation factors.
According to this view, medical
repatriation should not be an option because such patients should
not be transferred anywhere—instead, medically ineﬀective treatment should simply be withheld
or withdrawn. The fact that such
an approach would reduce cost
burdens to the hospital is incidental. Others disagree, arguing that
cost and resource allocation is
inextricably linked to the ethical
analysis in these cases, and that
the principle of justice must be
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weighed against the principles of
beneﬁcence and non-maleﬁcence.
For example, one could argue that
there is no harm from continuing
life support for a patient like
Malhi because persons in PVS
cannot suﬀer, and given that his
family members viewed postponing his death as a beneﬁt, this
could have justiﬁed continuing
life support. It is justice concerns
that deem such a beneﬁt as insufﬁcient when weighed against the
costs. The hospital has to meet
the needs of all the patients it
serves. Thus, the principle of
justice plays a signiﬁcant role
in determining whether medical
repatriation is ethically justiﬁed.
Patients for whom continued care
is medically ineﬀective without
discharge options continue to occupy a bed, medicine, and staﬃng
resources that may be needed by
others. Hospitals bear the costs of
extended periods of care for these
patients. If they pursue medical
repatriation, they also may shoulder the expense associated with
the transfer, which often includes
specialized medical transport
for patients with complex conditions (e.g. ventilators). Medical
repatriation raises the question of
whether this is the most just use
of a hospital’s limited resources
And the way the question is answered may spill over to the way
hospitals handle decisions about
withholding or withdrawing medically ineﬀective treatment, and
whether immigrants are unfairly
disadvantaged in these decisions.
Trust
Trust plays a critical role in the
healthcare enterprise. When hospitals eﬀectively deport patients
without their consent, there is an
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erosion of trust in the care relationship that may result in a patient being
unwilling to disclose information that is critical to decisions about treatment or reduces the likelihood that patients will seek needed care in the
ﬁrst place.
This failure to seek care may have signiﬁcant public health consequences, particularly in cases involving infectious disease. Further, delayed
care may result in the hospital providing higher-cost care than would
have been needed if the patient felt comfortable seeking care earlier, as
well as poorer health outcomes for the patient.

Ethical approaches to medical repatriation
In his article on the practice, bioethicist Dr. Mark Kuczweski proposed
three requirements for ethical repatriation:
1.
2.
3.

the transfer must be in the patient’s best interest, independent of cost concerns;
the patient or surrogate must provide informed consent to
the transfer; and
the hospital must exercise due diligence to ensure that the
patient’s medical needs are met upon return.6

While the best interest of the patient should certainly be a top priority,
disregarding the cost factor entirely is rarely possible, particularly for
safety net hospitals that provide a much greater proportion of uncompensated care and are already stretched ﬁnancially.
Policy approaches to medical repatriation
In light of the ﬁnancial constraints hospitals currently face, it is likely
that the practice of medical repatriation will continue unabated. While

the best interest of the patient should be the paramount concern, hospitals should consider the development of
policies and protocols to address medical repatriation and begin systematic data collection on such cases.
Data would provide a measure of accountability to ensure that policies are being implemented equitably while
also informing advocacy eﬀorts to create funding streams to support hospitals in this eﬀort.
Given its position at the nexus of immigration law and health policy, medical repatriation is a politically sensitive but increasingly common practice. It has faced strong criticism with some alleging that medical repatriation
amounts to “international patient dumping.”7 In the absence of meaningful legislation or regulation, however,
hospitals must take responsibility for developing policies that adequately balance the various legal and ethical
issues at play. Policies that clearly deﬁne decision-making protocols and informed consent processes for medical repatriation would be an important ﬁrst step and would clearly demonstrate institutional commitment to
conducting medical repatriation in a just and ethical manner.
References listed on page 19.
Lauren Levy, JD, MPH
Managing Director, Law & Health Care Program

ANITA TARZIAN NAMED HASTINGS CENTER FELLOW
Dr. Anita Tarzian has been elected a Hastings Center Fellow in recognition of
her contributions to the ﬁeld of bioethics. Dr. Tarzian is an associate professor at
the University of Maryland School of Nursing in addition to her role as Program
Coordinator for the Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network.
Dr. Tarzian has worked as a research and ethics consultant since earning her
doctoral degree in nursing ethics in 1998, providing guidance and consulting
services in clinical ethics, research ethics, and research methods. Her scholarship, teaching, and mentorship have centered on clinical ethics (including the
development of national standards for health care ethics consultation), palliative care, end-of-life care, disability rights, among other areas.
Professor Diane Hoﬀmann, Director of the Law & Health Care Program and founder of the Maryland
Healthcare Ethics Committee Network, said of Dr. Tarzian's appointment, "This is well deserved recognition of Dr. Tarzian as a leader in the ﬁeld of bioethics. In addition to her active and extensive involvement
in clinical ethics consultation, she is an accomplished researcher whose work has contributed signiﬁcantly
to national and international discussions of some of the most challenging ethical issues in healthcare."
Founded in 1969, the Hastings Center is an internationally recognized bioethics research institution dedicated to the examination of fundamental ethical issues in health care, science and technology. Dr. Tarzian
joins a community of more than 200 individuals who have been recognized for their scholarly contributions to the ﬁeld of bioethics.
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS

FEBRUARY
28 – March 3: 28th Annual APPE International Conference sponsored by the Association for Practical
and Professional Ethics, Baltimore, MD. Visit: https://appe-ethics.org/2019-call-for-proposals-2/.
MARCH
21-22: Vulnerability and Presence: Sixth National Nursing Ethics Conference, Los Angeles, CA. Visit:
http://ethicsofcaring.org/.
21-22: Deeply Rooted: Healthcare Ethics in an Era of Change, Healthcare Ethics Consortium 2019
Annual Conference, Atlanta, GA. Visit: https://hcecg.org/event-2970721.
28-30: Conﬂict Resolution and Clinical-Setting Mediation for Healthcare, sponsored by the Center for
Conﬂict Resolution in Healthcare, Memphis, TN. Visit: www.healthcare-mediation.net.
28-30: 8th International Health Humanities Meeting, Chicago, IL. Visit: https://healthhumanitiesconsortium.com/conferences-2/2019-chicago/.
MARCH
29: The Ethics of Seeking and Assessing "Quality of Life," Annual Medical Ethics Conference sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Center for Bioethics & Health Law, Pittsburgh, PA. Visit: https://
bioethics.pitt.edu/consortium-ethics-program/cep-calendar.
APRIL
5-6: Reproductive Ethics Conference, sponsored by Alden March Bioethics Institute, The Desmond Hotel, Albany, NY. Visit: http://www.amc.edu/Academic/bioethics/
11-12: Pushing the Boundaries: Scientiﬁc Innovation and Biomedical Ethics, sponsored by Cincinatti Children's Hospital, Liberty Township, OH. Visit: https://cchmc.cloud-cme.com/defaut.
aspx?P=5&EID=26366.
11-12: Controlling Death: Ethics, law, and the health professions, sponsored by Harvard Medical
School’s Center for Bioethics, Boston, MA. Visit: http://bioethics.hms.harvard.edu/annual-bioethics-conference.
13-15: Age and Longevity in the 21st Century: Science, Policy, and Ethics, Sponsored by the Global Bioethics Initiative, New York, NY. Visit: http://globalbioethics.org/upcmnevents/.
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS

APRIL
25-26: Patient-Centered Medicine, Annual John Collins Harvey Lecture & 6th Annual Pellegrino Symposium, Sponsored by Georgetown University’s Center for Clinical Bioethics, Georgetown University
Hotel and Conference Center, Washington, DC. Visit: https://clinicalbioethics.georgetown.edu/pellegrinoseminarandharveylecture
29 – May 3: Bioethics Intensive Course, sponsored by the Houston Methodist Hospital & The Center for
Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX. Visit: bcm.edu/ethics/
bioethics-intensive.
MAY
3: Communicating About Values and Valuing Communication in Healthcare, sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Center for Bioethics & Health Law, Pittsburgh, PA. Visit: https://bioethics.pitt.edu/
consortium-ethics-program/cep-calendar.
15-17: 7th Annual Conference of the Academy for Professionalism in Health Care, New Orleans, LA.
Visit: https://www.academy-professionalism.org/.
22-25: The 15th Annual International Conference on Clinical Ethics & Consultation (ICCEC), Vienna,
Austria. Visit: http://iccec2019.org/.
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RECURRING EVENTS
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series & Ethics for Lunch series, either at
Sheik Zayed Tower Chevy Chase Conference Center (1800 Orleans St.) Room 2117 or Feinstone
Hall, E2030, Bloomberg School of Public Health (615 N. Wolfe St.) Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM.
Visit: http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/educationtraining-2/seminar-series & http://www.
bioethicsinstitute.org/eﬂ
February 25: Diane Meier, MD, FACP, Hutzler-Rives Memorial Lecture: “Ethical Principles in
Action: Palliative Care and People Living with Serious Illness” (Zayed)
March 4: Dominic A. Sisti, PhD, Director, Scattergood Program for Applied Ethics in Behavioral
Health Care, University of Pennsylvania (TBD)
March 11: David S. Jones, MD, PhD, “Must Innovators Study the Unintended Consequences of
New Therapies? Lessons from Cardiac Therapeutics” (Zayed)
March 25: Marion Danis, MD, “Engaging the Public in Setting Health Care Priorities” (Feinstone)
April 8: Brian Carter, MD, Hutzler-Rives Memorial Lecture: “Insights from patienthood: A
pediatrician and bioethicist’s reﬂections on pediatric palliative care” (Zayed)
April 22: Eﬀy Vayena, PhD, “Digital Health Ethics: The Systemic Oversight Approach”
(Feinstone)
May 13: Holly Fernandez Lynch, JD, MBE, “Evaluating IRB Quality and Eﬀectiveness”
(Feinstone)
Also visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/eﬂ to view topics for the Ethics for Lunch series every
third Tuesday from 12:00 to 1:15 pm (Zayed). Co-sponsored by Johns Hopkins’ Hospital Ethics
Committee & Consultation Service and Berman Institute of Bioethics. CME & lunch provided!
Continuing Education 1-hour Online Programs provided by the Medical Ethics & Health Policy
department of the University of Pennsylvania: Children’s Roles in Medical Decisions, Ethics of
Human Research, Neuroethics, & Tarasoﬀ Duties. Visit: https://www.med.upenn.edu/ethics-andpolicy-online/continuing-education.
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The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization,
established by the Law and Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate and enhance ethical reﬂection in all aspects
of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing informational and educational
resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network
attempts to achieve this goal by:
•

Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within
their institution and as they strive to assist their institution act consistently with its mission
statement;

•

Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;

•

Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and
members of the general public on ethical issues in health care; and

•

Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of
patients in Maryland.

MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes
support from aﬃliate members who provide additional ﬁnancial support.

The Ethics of Medical Repatriation (continued from page 15)
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